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THE ROLE OF COMMON LAW CONCEPTS IN MODERN
CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE (A SYMPOSIUM)
mI. Common Law Crimes against Public Morals
JIM THOMPSON
If Mrs. Fedoruk had been more careful about
drawing the curtains on her bedroom window the
case never would have arisen, but on that dark
March night on Lulu Island the light from the
house drew one Bernard Frey to the window, much
as the proverbial moth is drawn to the flame.
"Man at window" screamed Mrs. Fedoruk and
Mr. Frey was promptly nabbed by the man of the
house. Arrested and convicted as a "peeping Tom,"
(the conviction was reversed for lack of evidence)
Mr. Frey then sued Mr. Fedoruk and the police
for false imprisonment, alleging that under the
Canadian Criminal Code it was no crime to peep
as did Tom.' This was conceded, but the defendants
argued, and the lower court so held, that it was
punishable as a common law offense. 2 This decision
was reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada, the
court holding that since the conduct alleged was
not made criminal by statute, and no precedents
for such an offense could be found in the books of
common law decisions, an action for false imprison-
ment would lie.3
Five years later, however, a superior court in
Pennsylvania reached the opposite conclusion. In
Commonwealth v. Mochan4 the defendant was con-
victed of making obscene telephone calls, during
which he suggested acts of intercourse and sodomy,
to a woman. The calls came in over a four-party
line and at least two other persons in the household
overheard some of defendant's language. As in the
Frey case, the defendant's conduct was not pro-
' From the conduct of one Tom, a tailor in the town
of Coventry, who was the only person to peep at Lady
Godiva. He was stricken blind.
WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY (1932).
2 Frey v. Fedoruk, [19501 Can. Sup. Ct. 517, [1950]
3 D.L.R. 513 (1950).
'Frey v. Fedoruk, supra note 2. "We have been
referred to no reported case in which the conduct of a
'peeping tom' was held to be a criminal offense," said
Justice Cartwright. "I think it safer to hold that no one
shall be convicted of a crime unless the offense with
which he is charged is recognized as such in the provi-
sions of the Criminal Code, or can be established by the
authority of some reported case as an offense known to
the law."
4 177 Pa. Super. 451, 110 A.2d 788 (1955).
hibited by any applicable criminal statute and a
search of the reports yielded no information that
such an offense was ever known to, or punished by,
the common law.5 Unlike the Frey case, however,
the defendant was convicted because the court
found in itself a power to punish, as a misde-
meanor, "any act which directly injures or tends
to injure the public to such an extent as to require
the state to interfere and punish the wrongdoer, as
in the case of acts which injuriously affect public
morality." This was the power which the Canadian
court had expressly rejected.
6
It is a general principle, long known to the com-
mon law, that any act which outrages the public
sense of decency or tends to corrupt the public
morals is a misdemeanor. Assume, then, an act
which is injurious to the public morals. Assume
further that no applicable criminal statute can be
found in the jurisdiction in which it is committed.
The question, raised by the Frey and Mochan cases,
is whether today's courts should have the power to
punish as criminal, acts, for which no precedents
can be found in the books, under the authority of
the general principle stated above.
It might be well, before attempting to answer
the question, to first examine the concept of com-
5 "It is of little importance that there is no precedent
in our reports which decides the precise question here
involved," the court noted. "The test is not whether
precedents can be found in the books .... " Bid cf.
Smith v. Commonwealth, 54 Pa. 209, 214 (1867).
6 Frey v. Fedoruk, 3 D.L.R. at 554. "To so hold would,
it seems to me, be to assert the existence of .. . 'the
power which has been claimed for the judges of declar-
ing anything to be an offense which is injurious to the
public although it may not have been previously re-
garded as such. This power, if it exists at all, exists at
common law.' In my opinion, this power has not been
held and should not be held to exist in Canada.... I
think that if any course of conduct is now to be declared
criminal which has not up to the present time been so
regarded, such declaration should be made by Parlia-
ment and not by the Courts." (Emphasis added.)
See Redd v. State, 7 Ga. App. 575, 67 S.E. 709
(1910), where the court said that ". . . whatever openly
outrages decency and is injurious to public morals is a
misdemeanor at common law and is indictable as
such." Bell v. State, 31 Tenn. 42 (1851), Common-
wealth v. Degrange, 97 Pa. Super. 181 (1929).-
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mon law crimes of acts injurious to the public
morals.
Not all immoral acts are crimes, although the
reverse may be true. The common law was not
concerned with the immorality of a man's private
life. Thus, acts of fornication for example, when
committed in the privacy of a home or other place
did not run afoul of the common law,8 whereas the
same act became an offense when committed in
the public square on market day and amounted,
in fact, to a public nuisance
Bigamy and incest, two crimes which are now
punished by statute in every state, were not crimes
at common law ° Illicit cohabitation, a continuous
living together in a state of adultery or fornication,
was likewise no crime unless it amounted to such
an open affair as to constitute a nuisance. The gist
of the offense was not the act itself, but the bad
example it set for the community-the undermin-
ing of the sanctity of the marital state."
Though the act of fornication was per se no
crime, it is well settled that the maintenance of. a
bawdy house was an offense at common law.
2
Not only did it corrupt the public morals by flaunt-
ing organized prostitution before the community,
but it brought people of generally low character
together. The courts felt this was a threat to the
public peace. Similarly, while gambling was no
offense under the common law,"3 the maintenance
8Anderson v. Commonwealth, 16 Am. Dec. 776
(Va. 1827). The same is true with regard to the offense
of adultery. GluGsB, THE CRnnNAL LAW, § 327
(1922).
9 Carotti v. State, 42 Miss. 334 (1868). "An act of
incontinence becomes an offense punishable at common
law only when it is combined with circumstances which,
beyond the mere criminality of the simple fact, were
calculated to make it injurious to society, as in case of
incontinence in a street or highway." (dictum). And see
Redd v. State, 7 Ga. App. 575, 67 S.E. 709 (1910) where
the court says that one of society's "inviolable decen-
cies" is that anything suggestive of sexual intercourse
shall be kept private.
"0 RuSSELL, I CP.ZES AND MISDEAMEANORS 937,
944 (8th ed. 1923).
11 Carotti v. State, 42 Miss. 334 (1868). "The design
. was to prevent evil and indecent examples tending
to corrupt the public morals, and to prohibit the public
scandal and disgrace of the living together of persons of
opposite sexes notoriously in illicit intimacy, which, as
it contemns lawful wedlock and lessens the incentive to
marriage, contravenes the public policy, and which
outrages public decency ....." The defendants lived
under one roof as master and servant and the court held
that their occasional acts of fornication did not amount
to illicit cohabitation.
"2 Henson v. State, 62 Md. 231 (1884).
13 McElroy v. Carmichael, 6 Tex. 454 (1851). But
where a cruel element is added it is unlawful, e.g.,
cockfighting. Commonwealth v. Tilton, 49 Mass.
(8 Met.) 232 (1844).
of a gambling house was indictable. 4 It encouraged
idleness and consequently corrupted the public
morals.' s Moreover, breaches of the peace were
likely to occur in. such places-especially when
one lost! And of course, a man could get as drunk
as he liked in the privacy of his home, but he
became a public nuisance when he left that do-
main.
6
Obscene and indecent acts of a public nature
were always crimes at common law. The publishing
of obscene writings, 7 exhibitions of obscene or
disgusting pictures and acts, 8 indecent exposure
of one's privates, 9 and the utterance of obscene
and profane language0 either shocked the public's
sense of decency or tended to the corruption of its
morals and so were nuisances not to be tolerated.
14 State v. Layman, 5 Del. (5 Harr.) 510 (1854). In
this case the defendant ran an oyster house and only
encouraged gambling incidentally as a means to increase
his patronage. The court held that he was not guilty of
running a common gaming house. "But it must be of
such a general or common character as thus amount to
a nuisance or it is not an indictable offense; for a private
person may allow gaming in his house."
"5 State v. Laynman, supra footnote 14. "...a gaming
house is also a nuisance if it holds out inducements and
attractions to bring together persons in such numbers,
or so often, as to make it injurious to the public,. and
dangerous to the neighborhood, by drawing the sober
and industrious into habits of idleness and vice, and
corrupting the young and unwary." Indeed, under this
theory it was once held that all amusements, conducted
for profit, were nuisances and misdemeanors. See State
v. Haines, 30 Me. 65 (1849), where a bowling alley
was held to be unlawful because "Clerks, apprentices
and others are induced, not only to appropriate to
them hours, which should be employed to increase their
knowledge and reform their hearts, but too often to
violate higher moral duties to obtain means to pay for
the indulgence." Contra, (and the modem veiw) is
State v. Hall, 32 N.J.L. 158 (Sup. Ct. 1867). where it
was held that the manner in which the aumsement was
conducted was the test of unlawfulness.
6 Tipton v. State, 10 Tenn. 542 (1831.)
17 Rex v. Curl, 2 Str. 788, 93 Eng. Rep. 849 (K.B.
1715). The defendant was found guilty of publishing an
obscene book. An earlier case, The Queen v. Read,
2 Str. 789, 88 Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B. 1708) had held that
publishing an obscene book was no crime but this case,
apparently the first obscenity prosecution in the com-
mon law courts, has never been followed. "
"8 Regina v. Grey, 4 F. & F. 73, 176 Eng. Rep. 472
(K.B. 1864). In this case the defendant exhibited two
pictures on the public highway to illustrate the curative
effects of his medicine. One showed a man, naked to
the waist, covered with sores. The court held that even
though the motive may have been innocent "No man
has a right thus to expose disgusting and offensive
exhibitions in or upon a public highway."
"1 Sir Charles Sedley's Case, 1 Keb. 620, 83 Eng. Rep.
1146 (K.B. 1663). The first reported indecent exposure
case. The defendant appeared naked on a balcony over-
looking the street. He then preceeded to fill and drop
bottles of urine on the crowd which gathered below his
window.
20 State v. Appling, 25 Mo. 315 (1851).
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Two offenses, blasphemy,2' and acts with respect
to dead bodies, were punishable at common law
not only because they shocked the public's sense
of decency, but also because they were an affront
to the Christian religion which was held to be part
of the "law of the land."2' Thus, to maliciously
insult the Christian religion was an indictable
offense.2' To burn a Bible was similarly a crime.2'
Men were punished for throwing dead bodies into
the street or a river,25 or for burning or otherwise
disposing of them in such a way as to offend the
public.26
This corruption of the public morals, this affront
to public decency, was considered so important by
the common law judges that results in some cases
were extreme in nature. Profane swearing, aside
from that which amounted to blasphemy, was a
public nuisance, but if said only once in conversa-
tional tones was no crime.2' Similarly, if a man
21 "Any oral or written reproach maliciously cast
upon God, His name, attributes or religion." BLACK,
LAW DICTIONARY, (3rd ed. 1933).
2'Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394
(Pa. 1824>.2 'Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 217 (Q.B.
1883). Words: "The God whom Christians love and
adore is depicted in the Bible with a character more
bloodthirsty than a Bengal tiger or a Bashi-Bazouk."
The court said that it was a question of whether the
defendant "calculated and intended to insult the
feelings and the deepest religious convictions of the
great majority of the persons amongst whom we live;
and if so they are not to be tolerated."
24 Reg. v. Petcherini, 7 Cox Crim. Cas. 79 (Ire. 1855).
A Redemptionist monk burned a Bible along with a
pile of other books. It was held that burning a Bible
would, as a matter of law, bring the Christian religion
into disrepute, and so the offense was blasphemous.
2sKanavan's Case, 1 Me. 226 (1821). Defendant
threw the body of his bastard child in the river. "It
must be also a crime to deprive them of a decent burial,
by a disgraceful exposure, or disposal of the body con-
trary to usages so long sactioned, and which are so
grateful to the wounded hearts of friends and mourners.
Good morals-decency-our best feelings-the law of
the land-all forbid such proceedings." See also Reg.
v. Clark, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 171 (Q.B. 1883).
26 State v. Bradbury, 136 Me. 347, 9 A.2d 657 (1939).
After the defendant's aged sister died he cremated her
in the basement furnace. The next door neighbor,
smelling the smoke, notified the authorities who came
and asked to see the sister. Defendant took them to the
basement, removed a shovelful of ashes from the furnace
and said, "If you want to see her, here she is." The
court said that it was not the cremation itself, but the
indecency of it in these particular circumstances, which
constituted the offense.
27 Goree v. State, 71 Ala. 7 (1881). And see State v.
Jones, 31 N.C. 38 (1848) where the defendant svore in
a loud voice at the complaining witness and his family
who lived in a house 200 yards away. The words were
apparently heard throughout the village, but the court
held this to be no offense. To be indictable the act had
to be committed "publicly and repeatedly" to the
"annoyance and inconvenience of the citizens at large."
exposed his privates on a public roadway and a
group of twenty persons came by and saw him an
offense would have been committed; whereas if
the twenty had come by separately, and no two
persons saw him at the same time, the law was
powerless to act.2 8
An exception to the general rule that the com-
mon law did not concern itself with strictly private
moral deviation was the offense of sodomy.2 This
25 The indecent exposure cases reflect the struggle of
the common law judges to define the concept of "public"
in acts injurious to the public morals. In Reg. v. Wat-
son, 2 Cox Crim. Cas. 376 (Q.B. 1847), the defendant
exposed himself to a twelve year old girl in a public
churchyard. The court held this to be no offense because
"a nuisance must be public; that is, to the injury or
offence of several." (Emphasis added.)
A year later the case of Reg. v. Webb, 1 Den. 345,
169 Eng. Rep. 271 (Q.B. 1848) held that indecent ex-
posure to a barmaid in a public bar was no offense. In
a note to this case the reporter summarized the appar-
ent state of the law at this point. "With regard to the
point decided in the principal case, it seems that the
law does not consider public decency to be represented
by one person in a public thoroughfare. The presence
of one person only is not deemed the presence of the
public; and the possible presence of others is too remote
a possibility for the law to recognize. But if others be
actually present, even though they do not see the
offence actually committed, the law recognizes the
risk of their seeing it as sufficiently proximate to be
dealt with as a reality." This view was apparently re-
affirmed in Reg. v. Holmes, 6 Cox Crim. Gas. 216
(C.C.A. 1852). The defendant exposed himself to three
women passengers (who actually saw him) in an
omnibus. An indecent exposure was committed when
"1... the evidence shows an exposure made designedly
before more than one person, or so made than any one
being in or coming in to the omnibus might see it ....
(Emphasis added.)
A later case, Regina v. Elliot, Le. & Ca. 103, 169
Eng. Rep. 1322 (Q.B. 1861), raised some considerable
doubt that the Watson and Webb cases were still good
law. The defendants lay naked on a common next to
a public highway for an hour while engaged in an act
of fornication. They were seen by only one person but
the prosecutor argued that if others had passed by they
could hare seen the act. Though this case was appar-
ently no different than Watson, and despite the
language in the note to Webb and the holding of the
Holmes case, the judges were split and no decision was
ever reached. Two years later, however, in Reg. v.
Thalman, 9 Cox Crim. Cas. 388 (C.C.A. 1863), a
unanimous court, which included three judges from
the Elliot case, laid down the rule that "if it is in a
place where a number of the Queen's subjects can and
do see the exposure, that is sufficient." (Emphasis
added.)
It would seem, therefore, that an indecent exposure
to the injury of the public morals, at common law,
must be such that it is seen by more than one person
or is committed where others who are actually passing
by could have seen it had they looked. See Reg. v.
Farrel, 9 Cox Grim. Cas. 446 (Ire. C. C. A. 1862). An
American case following this view is State v. Wolf,
211 Mo. App. 429, 244 S.W. 962 (1922).
2' Reg. v. Allen, 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 270, 169 Eng.
Rep. 282 (Q. B. 1848).
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offense was so far an exception that it was a felony
and not merely a misdemeanor. Indeed, the courts,
with extreme prudishness, were reluctant to
"spread upon the pages" any factual details con-
ceming the offense and indictments were always
vaguely worded.
The concept of crimes contra bonos mores has
been carried over into modem day statutes. In
most states these offenses are grouped in the
statute books under that specific heading.E Never-
theless, with this carry-over has come change.
In many instances the "public" v. "private" test
of the common law has been abandoned and acts
of private immorality which the common law
did not punish are now made criminal by statute.P
An examination, in some detail, of the changes
that the common law crimes of blasphemy and
sodomy have undergone at the hands of the courts
may be useful in determining whether the power
claimed for the judiciary in the Mochan case
10 See the language in State v. Whitmarsh, 26 S.D.,
128 N.W. 580 (1910); Honselrnan v. People, 168 Ill.
172, 48 N.E. 304 (1897); Glover v. State, 179 Ind.
459, 101 N.E. 629 (1913).
11 CAL. P -. CODE §261.
2 Ten acts which were not crimes at common law-
indecent exposure in the presence of one person,
bigamy, incest, adultery, fornication, oral-genital
copulation, non-illicit cohabitation, seduction, gam-
bling, and single acts of profane language-are now
punished by statute in various jurisdictions.
Indecent exposure: a crime per se in nine states, only
if others are actually offended or annoyed in twelve,
no crime in twenty-five states. Missouri punishes the
act of exposure to a minor, while in Florida the act is
criminal only if done on the premises of another.
Bigamy and Incest: a crime in all states.
Adultery: Slightly more than half of the states,
twenty-seven, punish the act of adultery.
Fornication: a surprising number, sixteen states,
punish the simple act of private fornication between
consenting adults. These are mostly southern and
eastern states, and Wisconsin.
Oral-genital copulation: Forty-one states punish this
as sodomy. Colorado, Kentucky, Michigan, and New
Jersey do not. It is not clear whether this act is in-
cluded in the crime of sodomy in North Carolina,
South Carolina, and Rhode Island.
Non-illicit cohabitation: a crime in twenty states, no
offense in twenty-seven, New York is a question mark.
Seduction: a crime in thirty-three states. New
Jersey punishes the act only if the woman becomes
pregnant.
Gambling: a crime in 45 states. Louisiana punishes
only the business of gambling. Pennsylvania punishes
the common gambler. Only unlicensed professional
gambling is a crime in Nevada.
Single acts of profanity: a crime in twenty-six states.
Alabama and California punish the act if committed
near a home or in the presence of women. Six states
punish if committed in the presence of women or
children. It is ix crime in Mississippi if in the presence
of two or more persons. The act is not criminal in
twenty-two states.
would be wisely used if generally recognized. Those
who favor the retention of the power may point
to the liberal trend in the blasphemy cases where
the modem courts have sharply restricted the old
common law definitions which punished as criminal
a wide range of acts. On the other hand, those who
would reject the use of the power, as the Frey
case did, may call attention to the fact that the
courts have, for the most part, and with the aid
of statutes, enlarged the common law definition
of sodomy to include acts which were not crimes at
common law.
The old casesn recognized two important ways
in which the offense of blasphemy could be com-
mitted: (1) the denial of God,3' and (2) exposing
religion to contempt or ridicule 3 Though some of
- Updegraph v. Commonwealth, 11 S. & R. 394
(Pa.1824) is an example. The defendant was indicted
for blasphemy. The offending words, uttered during a
debate on religion in a debating club, were: "That the
Holy Scriptures were a mere fable; That they were a
contradiction, and that, although they contained a
number of good things, yet they contained a great
many lies." The court reversed the conviction because
the indictment was faulty, but held the words clearly
blasphemous and left no doubt that any subsequent
conviction would be affirmed. "That there is an asso-
ciation in which so serious a subject is treated with so
much levity, indecency, and scurrility, existing in this
city, I am sorry to hear, for it would prove a nursery
of vice, a school of preparation to qualify young men
for the gallows, and young women for the brothel, and
there is not a sceptic of decent manners and good
morals, who would not consider such debating clubs
as common nuisances and disgraces to the city."
5 'In Cowan v. Milbourn, [1867] L. R. 2 Ex. 230, the
defendant was sued for breach of contract for refusing
to rent rooms to the plaintiff for the purpose of holding
lectures on religious topics. The titles of the lectures
included "The Character and Teachings of Christ-
the former defective, the latter misleading" and "The
Bible shown to be no more inspired than any other
book, with a Refutation of modem Theories thereon."
The court held that "any attempt by reasoning or by
the delivery of a lecture, to support and maintain
publicly the proposition that the character of our
Savior is defective, and that his teachings are mis-
leading, is contrary to the first principles of the law
of England." See also .ex v. Woolston. 2 Str.834, 93
Eng. Rep. 881 (K.B. 1728). where it was held that
blasphemy did not include serious disputes between
learned men on controversial points of religion, but to
write against Christianity in general was unlawful.
3- People v. Ruggles, 5 Am. Dec. 335 (N.Y.1811).
Words: "Jesus Christ was a bastard, and his mother
must be a whore." Defendant found guilty. But see
In re Gathercole, 2 Lewin 237, 168 Eng. Rep. 1140
(Q.B.1838). Words: "Petitions also for inquiring into
the numbers and state of these brothels for the priests,
the popish nunneries of the United Kingdom .... We
should be glad to know how many popish priests enter
the nunneries at Scorton and also how many infants
are born in them every year, and what becomes of them?-
Whether the holy fathers bring them up or not, or
whether the innocents are murdered out of hand or not?
.... [aIll things considered, it is impossible that the
19581
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these cases proceeded on the theory that the
Christian religion was part of the "law of the land,"
other courts argued that the essential reason for
the punishment of these offenses was because by
exposing religion to ridicule and contempt they
"tended to weaken the foundations of moral obli-
gation and the efficacy of oaths" 36 and this in turn
struck at some deep roots of civil government.
Gradually the "law of the land" argument was
discredited,3 and the courts began to place their
decisions on the ground that a malicious reviling
of the Christian religion in a land where that re-
ligion was practiced by a majority of the people
was likely to lead to breaches of the peace.3 The
modem view rejects the notion that a person may
not deny the very existence of God and thus strike
at the fundamentals of religion.3' It is the manner
of the criticism, and not the criticism itself, which
constitutes the offense.
The terms "sodomy" and "the infamous crime
against nature" were used interchangeably at com-
mon law.40 The offense involved copulation per
anum between man and man or man and womanYO
What of fellatio, also known as copulation per os
or oral-genital copulation? The first case to raise
the question, Rex v. Jacobs, held that oral-genital
copulation in the mouth of a seven year old boy
did not constitute the crime of sodomy at com-
mon law. This was also the view of the texts.
43
Some American courts, particularly in th
early twentieth century, began to expand this
common law definition to include oral-genital
contacts, acts which they regarded as even more
popish nunneries should be any less than brothels for
the priests." The court held that while the words
might constitute a slander on the nunneries at Scorton
they could not be blasphemous because the law would
tolerate the most viscious attacks on religions other
than the established one.
36 People v. Ruggles, supra note 35.
37See Reg. v. Ramsay, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 231
(Q.B.1883) and Bowman v. Secular Society, [1917]
A.C.406, which impliedly overrules Cowan v. Milbourn.' Reg. v. Bradlaugh, 15 Cox Crim. Cas. 217 (Q.B.
1883).
"I See the dictum of Justice Coleridge in Shore v.
Wilson, 9 CI. & Fin. 355, 539, 8 Eng. Rep. 450, 523
(H.L.1842). "I apprehend that there is nothing un-
lawful at common law in reverently denying or doubt-
ing doctrines.. . of Christianity, however fundamen-
tal".
40 Wise v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 757, 115 S.E.
508 (1923); State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 P. 632
(1913).4
1 Reg. v. Allen, 3 Cox Crim. Cas. 270, 169 Eng.
Rep. 282 (Q.B.1848).
42 Russ. & Ry. 331, 168 Eng. Rep. 830 (K.B.1830).
43 See the collection of writers in State v. Morrison,
25 N.J. Super. 534, 96 A.2d 723, 725 (1953).
heinous that those per anum, and eagerly seized
upon the slightest deviation in statutory codifica-
tions of the common law crime of sodomy to bring
in these acts. The decisions are best understood by
grouping them into several categories, depending
upon the wording of the particular statute they
interpret.
Where a statute merely bans "sodomy" and
does not otherwise define the term, all courts are
agreed, though some only reluctantly, that this
means only the act regarded as criminal by the
common law-copulation per anum."
In those states where the statutory crime is
"the crime against nature", the authorities are
split. Some, following the common law rule, hold
that the crime against nature and sodomy are
synonomous terms and oral-genital contacts are
therefore not included, 45 while others hold that
"the crime against nature" is a broader term than
sodomy and hence, oral-genital copulation, which
is "unnatural", 46 is included4 It is as much against
4, Commonwealth v. Poindexter, 133 Ky. 720, 118
S.W. 943 (1909); Wise v. Commonwealth, 135 Va.
757, 115 S.E. 508 (1923); Bennet v. Abram, 57 N.M.
28, 253 P.2d 316 (1953).
15 Koontz v. People, 82 Colo. 589, 263 Pac. 19 (1927);
State v. Johnson, 44 Utah 18, 137 Pac. 632 (1913);
People v. Boyle, 116 Cal. 658,48 Pac. 800 (1897); Kin-
nan v. State, 86 Neb. 234, 125 N.W. 594 (1910); People
v. Schmitt, 275 Mich. 575, 267 N.W. 741 (1936);
Prindle v. State, 31 Tex. Crim. 551, 21 S.W. 360
(1893).
46 In the sense that the only "natural" sex act is that
of fornication.
Are these cases which rely on the "unnaturalness"
of the act valid in the light of modem scientific sex
knowledge?
"While the genitalia include the areas that are most
often involved in sexual stimulation and response, it
is a mistake to think of the gdnitalia as the only "sex
organs" and a considerable error to consider a stimu-
lation or response which involves any other area as
biologically abnormal, unnatural, contrary to nature,
and perverse.
"In marital relations, oral stimulation of male or
female genitalia occurs in about 60 per cent of the
histories of persons who have been to college,... 20
per cent of the histories of the high school level and
in 11 per cent of the histories of the grade school level.
"Mouth-genital contacts of some sort with the
subject as either the active or the passive member in
the relationship, occur at some time in the histories
of nearly 60 per cent of all males." KINSEY, SEXUAL
BEHAVIOR IN T HusAN MALE 573, 576, 371 (1948).
(Emphasis added.)
47 Ex part Benites, 37 Nev. 145, 140 Pac. 436 (1914);
State v. Whitmarsh, 26 N.D. 426, 128 N.W. 580
(1910); Glover v. State, 179 Ind. 459, 101 N.E. 629
(1913); State v. Maida, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 40, 96 At].
207 (1915); State v. Cyr, 135 Me. 513, 198 At. 743
(1938); State v. Griffin, 175 N.C. 767, 94 S.E. 678
(1917); Ex Parte DeFord, 14 Okla. Crim. 133, 168
Pac. 58 (1917).
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nature "to make sexual entry at one end of the
alimentary canal as at the other" is their rationale.
Where the statute bans "sodomy or the crime
against nature" a recent case has held that the
two terms are synonomous,48 while others find in
the statutory language two distinct crimes, with
the second including oral-genital copulation.
With this background of how modem courts
have handled two common law crimes through
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries-restrict-
ing definitions of blasphemy and expanding the
definition of sodomy 50-it is possible to suggest
some answers to what is essentially a question of
whether society should be willing to trust the
courts with the power to punish acts, not banned
by any penal statute and for which no precedents
can be found in the books, under a general power
to punish all acts injurious to the public morals.
The dispute is a sharp one.a While the majority
of the court in the Mochan case answered the
question in the affirmative, the dissent character-
ized the majority's conclusion that the court should
exercise the power as an "unwarranted invasion
of the legislative field" and a judicial "romp
through the fields of the other branches of govern-
ment." Similarly, while the lower court in the
Frey case affirmatively used such a power, con-
cluding that a "peeping Tom" could be convicted
because his conduct was such as to naturally
invite retributive action from those offended and
thus tended to be a breach of the peace, the
Supreme Court of Canada declined to recognize
such a power in the courts.
Those who favor the exercise of the power point
out that it is rarely used and then only in those
cases where the acts are so abhorrent as to de-
serve punishment. This argument seems invalid,
however, when one considers that there was no
need to resort to the use of such a power even in
the Mochan case. The defendant suggested acts of
sodomy to the woman who received the phone
43 State v. Morrison, 25 NJ. Super. 534, 96 A.2d 723
(1953).
41 State v. Start, 65 Ore. 178, 132 Pac. 512 (1913).
Other statutes ban "a" crime against nature. Woods
v. State, 10 Ala. App. 96, 64 S.E. 508 (1914) holds
that "a" crime against nature includes oral-genital
copulation.
OThere have even been prosecutions for acts of
sodomy committed by married persons in private with
consent. Regina v. Jellyman, 8 Car. & P. 604, 173
Eng. Rep. 637 (1838); Smith v. State, 150 Ark. 265,
234 S.W. 32 (1921); Commonwealth v. Wiesner, 21
Lehigh L.J. 284 (Pa.1945).
1 See recent comments in Note, 59 Dicx. L. REV.
343 (1955); Note, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1092 (1955);
Note, 54 MicH. L. REv. 418 (1956).
calls. Solicitation to commit sodomy is a statutory
felony in Pennsylvania" and a misdemeanor
at common law.n Though the conduct in the
Mochan case is not to be condoned there is no
guarantee that the use of the power will be re-
stricted to instances where a dear injury to public
morals is found. Indeed, the court in Mochan ad-
mitted that the defendant's conduct only "tended"
to the corruption of the public morals, and it is at
least questionable that the necessary "public"
element was present in the Mochan case.M
A supposed argument in favor of the power is
that the use of the doctrine will have a deterrent
affect. Only its kind of flexibility can keep up with
some of the strange deviations of the modem
criminal mind its sponsors say. Whether or not
criminal conduct is deterred to any significant
degree by statutes and their provision for punish-
ment is a disputed proposition,"5 but this last
argument seems objectionable. Though a knowl-
edge of the law is imputed to everyone, as a prac-
tical matter this is a "palpable absurdity" and too
little is known of the statutory enactments against
criminal conduct. To suppose that criminals weigh
various courses of action and are deterred from
committing a particular act because of some little
known common law power inherent in the courts
is unreasonable.
Critics of the power argue that changes in, or
additions to, the criminal law should be made by
the legislature and not by the courts. This point
has merit. Under the power claimed in the Mochan
case it is up to the judge on the bench to decide
what conduct is criminal and what is not. The
individual, acting through his elected legislative
representative, has no say in the matter. It is not
even a jury question.
Aside from constitutional difficulties,5" the de-
cision by judicial fiat of what constitutes a crime
leaves the criminal law in an uncertain state. And
surely, if any law should be definite and certain in
its operation it would seem that the criminal law,
2 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §4502 (1945).
0 The King v. Higgins, 2 East 5, 102 Eng. Rep.
269 (K.B.1801).
" See footnotes 27 and 28, supra. The Updegraph
case is an example of how some judges have treated
those "gray" areas where acts should not be punished
as criminal.
5" Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality?
43 J. Cane. L., C. & P. S. 176 (1952).
6 The power has been criticized as ex post facto
judicial legislation. Comment, 28 CAN. B. Ray. 1023
(1950). And see the fourth paper in this series, "The
Constitudionality Of Prosecutions For Crimes Against
The Public Morals."
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